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US/EE/21

MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STATE AND HEADS OF GOVERNMENT  
Paris, May, 1960

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: May 17, 1960  
Time: 11:15 P.M.  
Place: American Embassy

Participants:

United States

Mr. Kohler  
Mr. Hillenbrand

Germany

Ambassador Wilhelm G. Grewe

Subject: Review of Summit Developments

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Mr. Kohler reviewed chronologically the developments during the day and outlined the various meetings scheduled for May 18.

He noted that one interesting statement during the meeting which had taken place earlier in the evening between Lloyd and Gromyko had been the latter's response, to Lloyd's question, that the Soviets intended no action during the 6 to 8 months suggested by Khrushchev for postponement of the Summit Conference which would increase tensions or make trouble.

Ambassador Grewe asked about plans for a NATO Council meeting. Mr. Kohler said that the Wednesday appearance of the three Foreign Ministers had been put off. It was felt that it would be better to postpone this until Khrushchev's departure.

With reference to the statement by the three Western Heads of Government, Mr. Kohler noted that while we would have preferred to put it out in the afternoon, it was postponed until this evening at the request of the British. Ambassador Grewe noted that the German press had almost unanimously placed the blame for developments on Khrushchev, but that it was

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- 2 -

undesirable to keep public opinion too long in a state of uncertainty about the official Allied position.

Mr. Kohler commented that this was certainly a weird conference. If Chancellor Adenauer had not desired that the Summit Conference take place, he had more than gotten his wish.

Ambassador Greve came back to the subject of Gromyko's suggestion to Lloyd. He wondered whether it could be considered as definitive. Mr. Kohler said that we would just have to wait and see what happened. Ambassador Thompson thought it was quite possible that the Soviets would not take any definitive action with respect to Berlin, although a few essentially propaganda measures might be introduced. If the assumption is correct that Khrushchev had probably misrepresented his relationship to the President for internal purposes, this has now been corrected and he has done what was required to strengthen his own position. The French apparently feel the same way about this. Ambassador Greve said he hoped this analysis was correct, but he was not convinced.

Ambassador Greve asked whether any contacts with von Brentano were envisaged for the next day. Mr. Kohler said not specifically; a need would arise only if the meeting of the three Foreign Ministers scheduled for 11:00 in the morning produced something which it would be necessary to discuss with him.



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MJH:llenbrand:all  
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